Among the flurry of announcements made by Joe Biden at the end of his presidency was something that caught many by surprise: the decision to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In return, Havana agreed to release 550 prisoners, many of whom were jailed for taking part in anti-government demonstrations in 2021.

Cuba’s economy has been hit by US sanctions and increasingly inconsistent supplies of fuel, funds and food from its traditional allies in Russia, Venezuela and China. Biden’s move promised a glimmer of hope, particularly for Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which has been particularly hard hit by the economic downturn. And though Donald Trump reimposed US sanctions on Cuba during his first day in office, Cuba’s president Miguel Díaz-Canel (pictured, on right, with Pope Francis) appears to have maintained its side of the deal by pressing ahead with the prisoner release.

This is probably because of the standing of the third party that brokered the original deal: Vatican City. “What is interesting in a diplomatic sense is the Holy See’s perceived neutrality,” Michael Higgins, a professor of Catholic history at the University of Toronto, tells monocle. “It’s why countries that have no history of Catholicism still want ambassadors to the Holy See.”

The Vatican has diplomatic links with 182 countries. While its diplomats’ recent attempt to reset US-Cuba relations has been undone, their work has become more valuable as international relations have deteriorated. “In a world that constantly seems on the road to collision, you need stabilising powers,” says Higgins. As the world gears up for a year of potentially complex peace negotiations in Ukraine and the Middle East, the parties involved might benefit from seeking divine intervention.

DIPLOMACY ––– SWEDEN
Q&A

Peter Ericson
Swedish ambassador to Finland

With his handlebar moustache and sharply tailored suit, Peter Ericson doesn’t look like your typical ambassador. But the man who became Swedish ambassador to Finland in May 2024 is one of his country’s top diplomats. We meet him in Helsinki to discuss his role and countering Russian aggression in the region.

Is your post more important now that Finland and Sweden have joined Nato?
Helsinki has always been an important ambassadorial post for Sweden. But the global security landscape has made co-operation more critical. The reason the Swedish foreign ministry wanted me in Helsinki was for my experience regarding Russia.

What is the future of the relationship between Nordic nations and Russia?
Engaging with Russia like we did in the 1990s is no longer possible. We need to constrain its ability to harm us. Even with Putin gone, Russia will be adamant about confronting the West.

Does Nato need a larger presence along the Russian border?
Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly in places such as Bucha and Irpin, has shown us that we cannot cede territory in the hope of later taking it back with reinforcements. We need to defend every inch of Nato territory – and Sweden has a major role to play in this.

For a certain sort of political leader, there is no easier win than taking an axe to foreign aid. For a start, foreign aid goes to foreigners, to whom supporters of this certain sort of political leader are generally indifferent. While those voters seethe that colossal quantities of their money are shipped overseas, the certain sort of political leader knows that the amounts are, in the grand scheme of things, tiny.

It is unsurprising that the United States Agency for International Development – US Aid – has been an early target of US president Donald Trump, via his hatchet man, Elon Musk. US Aid’s name contains the word “international”, which is nearly as toxic a word in some quarters as “foreign”. It accounts for a rounding error of about $50bn (€48bn), or only a little more than Musk spent on a social-media platform.

Many US voters, however, all but believe that their money is shovelled out of aircraft flying over Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. Polls have found that Americans estimate that about 25 per cent of the federal budget is spent on foreign aid; it is, in fact, about one per cent.

International aid is not charity; it is an investment – and one that pays for itself, time and again. In episode 573 of Monocle Radio’s The Foreign Desk, we spoke to Andrew Mitchell, former minister of state for development and Africa from 2022 to 2024 during the last Conservative government. The UK’s foreign aid, he told us, “makes Britain safer and more prosperous because it makes the poorest and most difficult parts of the world safer and more prosperous”.

Even the most rugged isolationist should be able to absorb this point. It might also be worth considering who is in favour of the US withdrawing from this field; among those offering their congratulations is Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev. If the West doesn’t get involved, then someone else will. — L

Andrew Mueller is the host of ‘The Foreign Desk’ on Monocle Radio.

Gorana Grgic on how the tech rivalry between the US, Russian and China will influence great-power relations.

Artificial intelligence (AI), advanced computing, semi-conductors, microelectronics, connectivity infrastructure and sensors have become arenas in which states vie for dominance. Technological competition between the two principal blocs – the US and its allies on one side and China and Russia on the other – has escalated significantly. This intensification is partly driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine. But it is primarily rooted in China’s military modernisation and efforts to establish an independent technological ecosystem.

The US and its partners across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific have responded to these threats by strengthening technological co-operation and limiting access to critical components. Yet China and Russia have circumvented Western restrictions through the use of underground networks and third-country intermediaries. Both states have also challenged export controls, while developing retaliatory measures against Washington and its allies.

Russia has shown an ability to exploit weaknesses in the global supply chain by leveraging a network of states across the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia to acquire critical technology components for military weapons. US-made semiconductors, from appliances such as microwaves and fridges, have consistently been found in Russian weapon systems on the Ukrainian battlefield.

But the threat of China is more concerning. Beijing has heavily invested in the domestic development of industries affected by export controls, particularly microchips. It has also reduced the market share of Western firms by imposing restrictions on critical materials such as rare-earth minerals. China’s use of surveillance and AI to collect data on its citizens is of great alarm to Western strategists. So too is the country’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, which integrates resources in the civilian and defence sectors to advance military development. Beijing is implementing this policy not only through its own domestic measures but also through the acquisition of foreign technologies. This obscures end-use export controls, making it difficult to impose restrictions on items that are supplied to China.

Recent developments in AI have intensified the rivalry between the US and Beijing. In an attempt to weaken China’s ability to train large-scale AI models, the Biden administration introduced trade controls on semiconductors. Though the US has long maintained a technological edge in AI, recent developments suggest that Beijing is rapidly closing the gap. Over the coming years, AI will be one of the biggest factors in altering the balance of power between nation states. Automation could drive economic growth, while advanced AI systems capable of directing weapons could offer military advantages.

Some observers view the narrowing technological gap between the US and China as an opportunity to negotiate an agreement on the use of these systems. Given the current tensions between Washington and Beijing, however, the chances of a deal are slim. If such an agreement were to emerge, it would probably take the form of a bilateral pact rather than a multilateral arrangement. Interstate relations are becoming more transactional, with defence and technology posing complex challenges to co-operation. — L

Gorana Grgic is Monocle’s security correspondent.

In the basket: Six ThyssenKrupp 212cd submarines

Who’s buying: Germany and Norway

Who’s selling: Germany

Price: Approx €1.2bn per unit

Delivery date: 2029

This is an extension of an order that was already on ThyssenKrupp’s books. Germany and Norway shelled out €5.5bn for six 212cd submarines between them in 2021: two for Germany, four for Norway. This new order for half a dozen more will even those numbers to six boats each. The 212cd is a hefty craft. At 74 metres long it is significantly larger than the 212a currently operated by the German Navy or the Ula-class of the Royal Norwegian Navy. This doubling of their 212cd fleet by the two Nato partners reflects obvious concerns about Russian machinations in the Baltic and further north. In Germany in particular, perhaps the acquisition will renew debate about the degree to which the country really wants to get over itself and finally grow into a military power commensurate with its economic and diplomatic stature.