Germany needs to rearm – but it’s easy to understand our aversion to the idea. We have to explain to people that if they want to live in a free and peaceful Europe, we need a strong military so that nobody thinks about attacking us.

Germany’s current aversion to defence comes from our history. During the 20th century our country was responsible for two huge global conflicts. It has been vital for us as a society to reckon with the past. That was the reason why the Allies dissolved the Wehrmacht, and everything military-related, in Germany after the Second World War ended. But our current predicament is dictated by more recent history. Germany rearmed by the 1950s as the Cold War intensified. In 1955 the Bundeswehr (Armed Forces) was founded and what was then West Germany became a member of Nato. After the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the Bundeswehr grew. Germany already had conscription in place and by the end of the 1960s there were about half a million soldiers under arms. In 1964, Germany spent nearly five per cent of its gdp on protecting itself. At the end of the 1980s, the German defence budget was nearly €60bn.

So what happened? The wall came down and, with it, the main threat disappeared overnight. Since the 1990s the number of soldiers under arms has dropped. Today our active-duty army stands at about 180,000 soldiers; we paused conscription in 2011. Germany militarised with the construction of the Berlin Wall and de-militarised when it came down. Now that paradigm needs to be rethought.

Germany, like other European countries, has been lulled into a false sense of security. This was true in the Germany I remember when I was growing up. Many thought that the Cold War was over and the paradise we had been longing for had arrived. There was no place in our collective imagination for the idea that the situation could change and war could return to our continent.

Even if the majority of the Germans alive today weren’t even born at the time, our commitment to peace remains our collective responsibility. An anti-military sentiment has been passed down through generations. Our history means that the military isn’t a popular topic. Whenever previous governments since 1990 needed money, they looked to take it out of the defence budget – and many people didn’t care.

That’s why our Armed Forces are run down today. In 2022, an investigation revealed that Germany only had ammunition to last a few days at war; defence minister Boris Pistorius said that there wasn’t enough money put into the military in the draft 2025 budget. The legacy of the Second World War, the fear that one day Germany might be responsible for another war, has left many people paralysed, afraid to make important defence-related decisions.

The very countries we attacked 80 years ago don’t suffer from the same issues. The best example is Poland. Many friends there now say that they are more afraid of Germany being too weak than too strong. Instead, they’re waiting for Germany to lead Europe’s military recuperation and counter Russia’s aggression. As Europe’s largest economy, it makes sense that Germany should play this role. We have rebuilt trust since the end of the Second World War. But it is also a strange position to be in. Everyone around us seems to believe in us but we still don’t trust ourselves.

So when Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, it took Germany time to wake up. But full-blown conflict did prove enough to stir us from our slumber. If you compare the state of our army currently to how it was just a few years ago, we have achieved a lot. A key moment was chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “Zeitenwende” speech on 27 February 2022, three days after Russia invaded Ukraine. He promised a historic turning point in Germany’s defence policy. A €100bn fund was created by finance minister Christian Lindner to increase military spending and we began to send weapons to Ukraine. But, despite this, the situation is incomparable to our army’s strength before the 1990s.

When I started studying political science at university, I had a conversation with a professor. We were focusing on Japan and its territorial dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands, just above Hokkaido, that have been occupied by Russian troops since 1945. It had been framed as a frozen conflict and we were questioning whether it really is possible to “freeze” a dispute. At the time we were all in disagreement. But I know that if I was having the same conversation now, my answer would be a definitive “no.” It might be the best way to handle a problem for politicians in the moment – pressing pause on an issue and seeing what happens next. But when I was in Japan in March 2023, I met the defence minister and encountered the same questions that I had discussed nearly 45 years earlier as a student. It’s no use freezing a problem and handing it down from one generation to the next. We must solve issues here and now.

Germany’s most recognisable recent leader, Angela Merkel, became infamous for freezing conflicts. When Russia grabbed Ukrainian territory in 2014, instead of leading other European countries in a strong response, Merkel dithered and hid behind the excuse that other European countries had to be consulted. But the hypocrisy couldn’t be more obvious; when it came to taking decisions such as striking a deal with Vladimir Putin over cheap Russian gas through Nord Stream 2, Merkel acted alone and against the interest of our European partners. In the end, the 2014 Minsk agreements suspended Russia’s attack on Ukraine for a little while – and we all know how that turned out. Merkel’s foreign policy was a total failure. She never explained that military problems could arise for Germany as a result of Russia’s actions. Instead, she promised something ambitious yet vague. In fact, her re-election slogan was, “Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben.” (For a Germany in which we can live well and like to live.)

Today’s politicians need to be clear with the German public: the situation has changed since the 1990s and will do so again. It’s natural that citizens are more preoccupied with everyday economic issues and their children’s prospects than defence spending. But a government’s job is to explain the risks and demonstrate how they are managing them. With its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has shaken the rules-based international order, which is the foundation of all international relations. That Russia would actually send troops into Ukraine was inconceivable for many before it happened. If Ukraine loses this war, there isn’t only the danger of Putin showing up on our borders next. There’s also the danger of a copycat effect. China might decide to force Taiwan under its control; Iran has already attacked Israel; Serbia might decide that Kosovo has been independent long enough. If the rules-based international order collapses, peace and freedom are at risk. The mere idea of the EU as a civil power would become obsolete.

There is no doubt that we have the chance to live in a positive future. But for that to happen, Germany has to get rid of the fear rooted in our history and show real leadership. Putin knows that most Germans will want to block out terrible stories of war and focus on improving their own lives (“living well”, as Merkel called it). Let’s not forget that Putin lived in Germany, speaks our language and understands our mentality well. But voters here have a choice.