The Arctic melt is uncovering more than just resources and trade routes – it is also opening up a whole new theatre of military operations.

Of all the world’s territorial disputes, the ones in the Arctic – and there are plenty – used to matter the least: the only prize at stake was frozen ocean, and most of the time it was too cold for military forces to operate there anyway. National boundaries were left to blur among the floes.

Suddenly those vague Arctic territories matter. The region is increasingly ice-free and the open ocean means rich fishing, undersea mineral and energy resources and new sea lanes. The Arctic, in other words, has become a valuable commodity.

Best placed to assert ownership are the “Arctic Five”, littoral Arctic Ocean states with well-established territorial claims and regional bases.

“Russia and Norway are the two states most active and deliberate in raising their capacity for operating in the Arctic,” says Ernie Regehr, senior fellow in Arctic security at the Simons Foundation – a Canadian think-tank.

Canada, Regehr says, made some “dramatic announcements regarding enhanced military capacity in the north”, but these have since run up against financial realities, while the US has been too preoccupied elsewhere to devote much energy to revamping its Arctic presence.

Russia is arguably doing the most: its North Sea Fleet is being restocked and is due to receive a new Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France; six new $1.1bn (€816m) icebreakers, which, at 170 metres in length, will be the world’s biggest; and later new aircraft carriers.

The Norwegians, meanwhile, have procured a new fleet of five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, which, together with its six Ula-class submarines, have significantly boosted its naval clout.

Yet it would be misleading to suggest that an Arctic arms race is underway. Bases are being upgraded, ice-breaking fleets expanded and modernised, and Arctic battalions retrained and up-armed. But the sheer remoteness of the Arctic makes conflict almost unthinkable, says Regehr.

“Military preparedness in the Arctic is really only meaningful if it enhances a capacity to contribute effectively to search and rescue, emergency response and support for public safety,” he says, citing a “universal insistence” among the Arctic Five that any competition will remain amicable.

New interest in the Arctic threatens to make it a crowded place, however. The Arctic Council – which already includes Finland, Iceland and Sweden in addition to the Five – voted in May to admit several new observer members, including China, India and Japan. Of these, China has taken the keenest interest: in 2012 its sole icebreaker, Xuelong, completed the first transarctic voyage by a Chinese vessel and a new $200m (€150m) icebreaker is due for delivery in 2014, with additional ships planned, as Beijing seeks to open up the High North as a conduit for Chinese trade.

Regehr is optimistic that these new players can be peacefully accommodated. “The risks are not China or India specifically,” he says. The concern is that more and more ships will be operating in waters which will remain dangerous even as they become navigable. “Human and commercial activity are in a sharply ascending arch; so too are the risks.”