Makis Voridis is considered the most hardline representative of the right wing within New Democracy, the centrist ruling party in Greece. This is something that he does not deny. Οn the contrary: he likes to emphasise it, believing that his country needs to redefine its relationship with conservative thought and break the “ideological dominance of the left”. His appointment to the Ministry of Migration Policy is indicative of the Greek government’s intention to adopt a stricter stance on a fundamentally European issue. Voridis spoke to Monocle in his Athens office about Greece’s expertise in asylum services, co-operation with Turkey and the “active deterrence” policy of the nation’s coast guard.
You say that Greece has developed expertise in asylum services. Have other countries shown interest in learning from Greece?
Yes. In the past, EU member states such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus and the UK (before Brexit) requested bilateral assistance from Greece regarding asylum procedures. They recognised Greece’s progress in processing asylum claims quickly and effectively. Further collaboration is expected with the implementation of the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is scheduled for June 2026. Member states will need to establish procedures for identification and asylum granting, and Greece can definitely play a leading role.
Turkey is a crucial part in European migration policy through its strategic location and as host to millions of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. Dangerous smuggling networks operate within its borders. What is the current state of Greece-Turkey migration co-operation?
Collaboration between the Turkish coast guard and the Greek coast guard is generally good, which is one reason why migration flows from Turkey are relatively low. However, the readmission agreement is not functioning as it should. The agreement stipulates that migrants who come from Turkey, which is considered a safe country, should be returned if their asylum application is rejected. But Turkey is not accepting them back.

You’ve emphasised that deportations are a top priority in your agenda for the Ministry of Migration Policy. Could you explain your reasoning behind this focus and how Greece’s approach to migration is evolving? Are we witnessing a fundamental shift in policy?
I wouldn’t call it a new doctrine but rather a new phase. The actual policy shift happened during the first term of the Mitsotakis government, when the previous Syriza government’s approach – to essentially let everyone in, allow them to rest in the sun then move on to other European countries – was abandoned.
The first phase was establishing an effective system: control, identification and efficient asylum processing, a task that was successfully tackled by my predecessors. The second phase had to do with the realisation that integration of all incoming migrants was an unrealistic goal and that border control was essential. This led to the fence at Evros (almost eliminating land arrivals) and enhanced maritime border security through the coast guard.
For context, 18 per cent of Greece’s prison population consists of migrant smugglers and roughly one smuggler is arrested per day. Now we enter the third phase: returns. Deportations are one part of that.
You mean that there are also the so-called voluntary returns.
Exactly – voluntary and forced returns. I want to increase both but especially assisted voluntary returns. We must explain to those who remain illegally that the environment will become tougher with stricter criminal penalties, which will make it pointless to stay. They can instead choose to leave in a structured and supported way.
The facts
Migration flows to Greece have decreased by 27 per cent in early 2025, with arrivals dropping from 9,342 in Q1 2024 to 6,773 in Q1 2025. Main entry points include the northeastern Aegean islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos), southeastern Aegean (Rhodes, Kos), and, increasingly, the central Mediterranean through Crete.
Stay illegally, face 18 months detention
You mentioned non-co-operative countries such as Turkey. Does this only apply to forced returns?
Correct. In voluntary returns, Greece, particularly the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, works closely with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Frontex [the EU’s border agency], offering incentives such as plane tickets and financial support for relocation. In these cases, countries of origin cannot refuse repatriation.
What happens when a migrant refuses to leave and their home country won’t take them back forcibly?
That’s where the problem lies. When forced returns cannot be executed, we implement an 18-month administrative detention. The goal is deportation and the migrants are held until their removal is carried out or it’s determined that they can’t be. If nothing can be decided after 18 months, they are released. That’s why we need more effective penal measures.
So you’ll establish a stricter legal framework to prosecute migrants who refuse to leave after their asylum claim is denied, essentially driving them to choose voluntary return over prison?
Exactly.
When do you plan to implement this new legislation?
Soon.

You brought up the operational role of the coast guard. There are allegations of pushbacks. How do you respond?
We need to clarify that active deterrence is entirely legal.
As long as it doesn’t endanger human life.
Under no circumstances should lives be endangered. It’s not the Greek coast guard putting lives at risk but the smugglers. Active deterrence is legal and legitimate but some NGOs deliberately confuse the terminology. Active deterrence means that you can’t just enter a country whenever you want – the Greek state has a duty to protect its territory. Pushbacks are another matter.
Do pushbacks occur?
Greece has never admitted to such actions.
How do you respond to claims that the coast guard has performed dangerous maneuvers at sea?
The coast guard does everything possible to save lives endangered by smugglers, including many rescues. Claims to the contrary are provocative and insulting.
At a recent court ruling in Leipzig, Germany appeared to enable mass deportations to your country. How do you respond to this development considering Greece’s push for easier deportations to Turkey while Germany contemplates returning migrants to Greece?
It’s an issue that concerns us. So far, there have been no such requests. Also, it’s a matter that raises complex legal questions.
This discussion is essentially about the Dublin Regulation. Greece has long argued that the EU unfairly distributes the migration flows. What is your approach?
Simply this: we need a common EU policy. Returns shouldn’t involve just the country of first entry, they should go to the country of origin. We must act collectively as Europe. A collaborative return mechanism is essential – that’s what the new Migration Pact promotes. Otherwise, we’re just going in circles. Discussing how many migrants Germany should return to Greece when Greece and Cyprus already have the most asylum seekers per capita is a fruitless discussion.
What matters is that we use the EU’s leverage to reach out to countries of origin and demand they respect the return mechanism. Even if the EU doesn’t act collectively, multilateral agreements can still be pursued. Greece, Germany, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Spain could, for example, co-operate and jointly approach destination countries within the framework of a multiparty negotiation.
The facts
Most migrants originate from Afghanistan, Syria and Egypt – with Egyptian arrivals predominantly being unaccompanied minors. Current data shows that 55 per cent of asylum applications are approved. Greece and Cyprus maintain the highest proportion of asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants among European countries.
The Leipzig court ruling revealed that Germany had previously avoided returning migrants to Greece due to concerns about living conditions. The court has now determined that migrants in Greece will have access to “bread, a bed and soap.” How do you respond to these characterisations of migrant reception conditions in Greece?
Both the specific decision of the German court and another related decision by the European Commission essentially acknowledge the significant progress that Greece has made on a number of issues concerning the management of migration. Claiming that a migrant sent to Greece would die of hunger is certainly not flattering for the country, so in that sense this is a positive development, even if it is not convenient in terms of migration policy.

Regardless of your approach or ideological stance on migration, there is an objective reality. That is Europe’s demographic crisis, with Greece being among the countries facing the most severe problems. How do you approach this issue and how do you perceive the role of migrants in the Greek economy?
First of all, I reject the notion that Europe will solve its demographic problem by importing migrants. The answer to the issue is to look at what incentives we can offer to increase European populations. In other words, we must look at how Greeks and Europeans can be encouraged to have more children. This is a matter of family and demographic policy. There is no other solution.
Regarding the labour issue, the problem is exactly that European migration policy must aim at two levels: controlling illegal immigration and organising legal immigration. Legal migration must be linked to the needs of our production and supported by a mechanism through which people come here by our selection under strict and rational criteria. They will be paid, insured, work for a specific period and then return to their homelands and families. If needed, they will return again.
Recently, both in Greece and elsewhere in Europe, migration policy has become stricter. One reason is the mass migration flows of previous years, which have put pressure on local communities. Has the rise of anti-European parties also played a role?
In reality political results are produced by the citizens’ vote, which might be shifting in the direction that you describe. But why? Because leftist and social-democratic political forces were not listening to them. These parties reached the point of trying to paint the voters as crazy.
If I go to a working-class neighbourhood and my constituents tell me that living conditions are difficult and that they cannot let their children play in the public square because it has been taken over by illegal migrants who behave offensively toward their daughters and I respond “you are a racist,” then it is inevitable that a political shift will occur. Whereas I should have addressed the problem faced by our citizens. Isn’t that the very dialectic of democracy?
Elective government is a wonderful thing because it is built on a dialectical relationship with the public. The difference between Greece and other European countries is that it had the necessary political reflexes to avoid this risk.
How would you describe migration policy in Greece today in a single phrase?
Strict but fair.