Column / Petri Burtsoff
Bloc chain
During the cold war, Finland’s decision not to join Nato made perfect sense. In Europe, the military strength of the Soviet Union far outstripped that of the multilateral alliance and Finland had suffered a traumatic defeat at the hands of its eastern neighbour in the Second World War. Back then, neutrality was the key to Finland’s independence. Even membership of the European Community (the precursor to the EU) was ruled out because it would antagonise Moscow. This policy became known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine and it is still taught on international relations courses the world over as an example of shrewd statecraft.
But the doctrine is outdated. Finland has not been neutral since it joined the EU in 1995 and the euro in 2002. Since then, it has participated in Nato-led military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, often more wholeheartedly than actual Nato members. Its military is Nato-compatible in both the way it trains its soldiers and the weapons it uses, such as the 64 Lockheed Martin F-35 multi-role fighters (pictured) it has just bought from the US. But, most importantly, the cold war is over and there is no Soviet Union; only a bullish, antagonistic Russia whose insistence on “security guarantees” is correctly recognised by Helsinki as an attempt to exert pressure on its sovereign neighbours.
So, just as the Baltics did in 2004, Finland should join Nato. The mutual defence clause in the alliance’s Article Five would offer Finland security guarantees against Russia, which has proven itself more than willing to invade sovereign European nations. Joining would also serve to further anchor Finland in a community to which it belongs and – since 90 per cent of EU citizens live in a Nato-aligned country – in which it arguably already resides.